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IN 
TRANSITION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA 
By Ann Seidman 
As the peoples of the region struggle to liberate themselves 
from the domination of the racist state capitalism of South 
Africa, southern Africa is in transition. This paper analyzes 
that process by, looking, first, at how the South African regtme 
~\ ( S'w\\- ?! r-, •' , 4..,~ 
has used racism to legitimate the e:-:ploitation of the region's 
) 
African population by South African- based mtning finance houses 
and transnational corporations; second, the nature of the 
obstacles confronting the ne1ghbor1ng states seektng political 
•nd-eco~Gmic independence 1 and development; and, third, the 
c onsequences of these contradictory factors for the possibilities 
of building an integrated, industrialized reg1onal economy 
capable of providing increasingl y productive employment 
opportunities and higher living standards for all the region ' s 
inhabitant~ 
I. South Afr1ca's racist s tate capitalism: 
1. This paper was originally written for a conferenc e that took 
place over five years ago. Updat1ng it has underscored the 
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state :ap1talism has shaped the i1-1stitutior1s that coer-ced the 
the 1970s r1early 100 percent I),--- -[· "1 -.~:. fj ,-·~ j ,-··1 .. ,. l. ,- ··.:;; ':." ( .... ... l .! 1~. ·: . ..... -- l I. IL .v . to l:::.u.:i.ld a. t:~.qht 
mil"i.t:.D.r ';/·····indu::::.t:.t~i;:·~.l c::ompl(:·>:. t:.o ~:;:.f~r·-v~:::~ t.hf.~ 
-rt1cy often arqucd over methods. Eiut. 
T"!'"·~f~ {."~+~·-ik~J.a.n~s 'voDI'··t:.r-E-'I.E:r··s +CJr-t.hr-iqht.l·y-
tt1e A-fricans doing the manual work under-
cclrrcl:i. t::i.ur·J•:•: uf UtJ.tr·:i.r::ht sJ av<~r·y w.· 
.. > n 
V·JD. 
"l"h(-:·2 
·f or~ (·~ h (·:-:-: -:::l. r·· :::; 
ation ·to ~~o:Lland·s Asian 
...... 
.. :. 
Sir ~-iarry Jot1r1stone~ 
(F'r··(-:::ot.c::.r··i a.:: 
t1ad col!Jnized tl1e l~ape a~s a 
colonies. (D. Hobart HolJq~1ton, 
T D ~·J n ~ D >~ + u r·· c! t...i n :i. \/ .:-:-::• 1 · ·;::; -i. -!::_ ·/ 1-:> ,.-- o:-::·: ::::. :::; ., 
!Jf British policy, 
..• i.·f t!·1e Eur·cpear·) capitalist car·1 be it-ldt.IC!?d by 
proper security to in·test t1is !nonev in Africa ar·td i·f 
r1ative l0bot.tr cat··~ be obtair1ed by tt·1e requisite 
quara11tees of fairplay towards native rj.ght 
n12terials~ mantA·factured qoods and n1arkets. 
·rhe W~1ite capitalist .... must have sometllinq cotlceded 
to him. ·r~lP r1ative mt.tst be prepared i:o quar·ar1tee a 
fait~].y l1at1dsorr1e retLtr·rl for ITID11ey hazar·dcJusly invested. 
All tl1at r1eeds be done is ·fot·· tt1e Adn1irJis·tratior1 t.(J 
·."·· t~ ,;:~,;:; f r· i f~:-nd-:::; to both ~:.i rJc~s ~ ,::tnrJ l. ntr··udu.ct::·~ "l":.hc.\ 1\l.:::.d: i VE· 
:laiJoLAr-er to the European capitalil~t. A qer1tJ.e 
ir1sis·tar1ce that the Native should corltt··ibute his ·;:air 
sl1ar·G to t~1e r·ever1ue of his cour1try by payirlg t·1is ta:-: 
is all th0t i.s necessary or1 our par-t to er1sur·e t1is 
ta~~ir1g a s~~ar·e ir1 l:ife's labour· W~liCil r1c1 t1umar1 IJeing 
~:::.hou.l d -:::;_vui d. 
R0pLtblics i1··1 ti-le rich Tr·ar1svaal until the discovery first of 
c!i,::l.[(":l~)ildS.I LI··IIC::>rl qc:JJ.d .. Britist·1 finance capital ·s e·fforts to e:<ert 
,·:! .. ll"fht::· Impo!·-tancE·! o+ Pl+r··ic:,:·:~.~ 11 ~J. 
l ·;:r;.:;-. 
A·frica11 Society, J. 1918.J p. 
or··eatcr contr-ol over the mir1es led to the Boer war. 
Ir1 tt·1e lJ!liDll of South Afr·ica oi 
E·~n:::;h~··inc.'d hlh:lte ru.leH 
scattered fragments 
1.1"1\ ,·:·i.j":)C:l.b}\:7.\ Of V:i..:J.!JJE~ t::/i!.:'7V'E:'.'J.C:JprrlE1ni: "] ~ E:\i""ld E~·;::;·I::.D.!::JJ:i.:::;hi.nc:j t.:hc-:0 / ... iJ.ncJ f::d.fl!·: 
to fir1011ce t~Je Boer far·mers,, 
Ir·1 r·easj.r1gl.y corltr·cllled by the rr1ini11g 
conom~· tnusl·lr·ocJtnecJ. 
contract~ living 1n c:rowded mine compotJnds, away ·tro1n t~1err 
~:arnilies fur ntonths on er1d, their wages barely er1ouqh for· 
::::.1 . ..1.1'"" \f i · .. :" ;:: •. ]. " 
~;0les o·f ct1eap foc1d to tt1e mine owners for thej.r growing labor 
!, fht:.' .,:~.muur·1t. 
d E·:· ·:::; i q n ,;:1, t: t·:~ d 
was ir·tcreascd scJmewt·Ja·t late!- to 
tJr1der apartt1ei.d as 'bantustar1s' 
1 ::~; PE'I'··ct::~r·~t u+ 
( · homt-?1 ands · 
(:.hr:·.' 
t the 1920!3, domil-tated by tt1e Anqlo-AmeriE:ar·l Cor·por·ation (see 
Dl111C~n Ir111es, Ar1glo america ar1d tt1e Rise of Modern Soputl1 A·fricaq 
( 1\j c~ 1;\l \" u r· k ~ lv\ on t. h l \' h: f.7; \/ i ;:·:·:-> hl F' r t:·:· ·:;:; ::s ~' 1 c;o U t:~ ) L h E~ :;;:. c-::· c: (:l n q J. c.1 m t:·.:· 1···· .:::1. -1.:: ''"~ :::; o \/ E> 
time r··ej_r1·~ested ·t~teir mir1ing pr-o·fits to exer·t c:o11trol over rnost 
,::.;f t.ht.'.:' :::::oJ . ..J.t./'1 (i-fr .. ic<C~.n E:cunomy .. 
::. cj 
p!JDr white· problem. UnabJ.e to cotnpete 
iob sl-~ills i11 the ci·ties 
1·t·1e issue ca~te to a head ir1 tl~e l.920s w~1er1 w~1ite Wo~id W3r :l 
.·:... :i. 1 1 (;:·c:l .,· i"li··l <::: ' "7 / jvj.c.t ._.. 1. ll'J l. .._, .. ,· 1·- ···1 1··1 , .... () .L .,· ·(·· ;;;; . ·-· ..... , v ,_". .. •- .. l~;. .. . I ....... , 
r h c:-' (.~J h l t. f·~ 
+J.:::·,_q::. flyinq~ t.ht.::'\/ mar·(:hE.•cl :Lr··:to t:ov-Jn <3.ncl ·:;::.ei:.:::t::~d contl·-·o]. ()f t.hc· 
hlJng some of lhe leaders . 
.l1 /CCI. 
t"C·:l•:::ctoi·<:JtE' vntt:,:~d in ;,;;_ qovt:?r··nmt:-:~nt comrnit.t.r:,•c:l i::.c::. impo::;:i.tion of ·l:.:hc~ 
(o"f.c:JI.JI' BE•.r·· tn E·'ns:.ttr··E:· thE~ b(·:':..'~~;t .".iut:J~:; ;;:"Inc! hiqh lnconlE~~3 fot··· t.hf.-:~ t•·.Jh:i.t:r:·:·:~ 
Her-zc,g expl.air1ed tt1e 11ew ·civilized Labour-· poJ.icy to 





In the ir1te~ests of the A·fr1cans who would tte 
SotJt~l Afric:a should ~eserve pLtlic service ar1d railways as 
''·::::.f.J1"lE:I'·c;;·,;::. c1·f E~!"i"iplc:o',/ITIE·'rlt. fc•r·· Dur· c:::i.t.i1:i.~-~f~c! l,;":i.hDJ...Il""""., 1 ' 
!:..l-t:i.\···1(_:] tJy t.hFC:.' rl-:"J.-t:.i\/(."_•·~:;, 11 v 
provide s~lel.ter··ed employment for unskilled wt1ites: 
1·~-1ev came from rural areas to tt1e towns~ competed 
11\1:i.t:h C:olcrulr·E~d~::; z:.~.ncl {\+1----ii:,_J_n-s +or·· pick c\ncl :~:-hO\/t".-::01 wor-k ,-:;1_t_-_ 
bs or less a day, ar1d viola·tetj wl1ite StJpr-emacy tatJcJu~; 
bv ml}:ing with therr1 in the meanest residential 
!lLtar·ter·s ..... l~le ur·ban poor wt1i.te was •..• a po·ter1tial 
r--o:::::>c:r··u.:i.t +Dr· ,-,:\ r··E:\dic:r:":l.l non---~-··01.1:i<J.l cla:::;~:; mo\f\:-?fTlE~nt. Tht-:} 
N0ti(J1·1alist~ r··ec:ognized the tl11~eat to wt1j.te 
solidarity. Subsidized emrJloyment or1 public wor·~:s 
v._,C:>I . ..i.Jd i~sDl-:3.l".:t:-~ hirn ·ft-Din tht::o d,:":\1'"-k···-~::;k:i.nnr:::-:·d laUDur·e·r··~::; ,·:-:l.nd 
g1ve hinl a stake in the pe~petuation of colou~-class 
.-j :i ':;:;.c: ,..-- l ifl i n D.t. i C:.)l"""l " ''V 




n,J.t i onLi_l 
state capitalist par·astatals1!) 
economic gr·uwth to expand 
opportur1lties ar1c1 to reduce 
ir·1 cooperation wit!··1 t1·1e mir·1ir1g fj.nanre 
to 
\!·Jh i t:. (;.\ 
thf? 
:::;t:. i mu 1 <;:. .. t \:7' 
~·..J CJ ~"~. 1-.: e r·· ~; .-
riiJ.t:t (jf"i. :;:; 
t·1ouses ancl B1~itist1 steel ·Lfir·ms, begar1 to btJild a natiiJna! steel 
j_ n c:l u. :::; t r- \' fhc-:~ E:l (-!:~ct:r·· :i. cal ~:lupp 1 ';/ Comm:L :::;:::.i cJn ( EE;1 ::CJI"/) "::;tar-·i.::.E:~d 
tlUJ.ltJ:ing a 11at:ior1al electri!:ity supply grj.d to pr-ovide powe1·· 1·!Jr 
I11 t1·1e l 1J30s, tl1e deveJ.oped r1atioJ1s' devaluation of t~leir· 
ctJ1·r·e1·1cies boosted the prices and ouput cJi SotJth Africa s qolrJ~ 
boosting ir1dustriaJ gr·owth despite the world-·wide dcpressior1. 
By c:LAtting off imported mar1u1:actures~ World War :ll further 
son1e ot thej_r leaders just released fF(3ffi 
won the majority o·f votes in 
aln1ost entirely wt1ite electior1s. Systenlatically, tl1ey lJaqan to 
1mpose apartheid, 211 offi.cia1 pol.icy c1f separ-atir1g the races. 
Tt·1is is r1ot tt1e plac:e t~ spell OIJt the steps by which the 
l:2" {':Jcn n E'-::s t: ~/ 
(·:1-f l'~ j_ c: ,::-\ ( L..ondc:1n 
c:::i.t:.n, iJ~ l 4" 
Il·lter·r·latiorlal, Pol.itj.ca1. 
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r1 i -fi ~.;;tnt 
i 
!,".} h 1 t (';.".• ~;:; ' 
+or- t.hi ;:;; 
as well as the ovel~whelrnir·Jg 
-:3.1'"·1,::\J. ';.tSi ~: j_ S thE• 
fHd. j 01''" i t· CJ+ bla.c:l.c\(J/I,.ihat 
;.:-:~>-: p 1 u :i. t cJt i or1 
t.c:o +tJI''l:hel" ;;t:imulatP r·dpic:l Inciue•:tl·ial:i.:::.:.\t:Lur·,d 
T'i1e gover-nment rr1arr·ie(J its parastatal a(:tivj_ties with mi11inq 
tJ.me, i_t created new 1ncer1·tives to persuade transnational. 
Direct U.S. investments, aloneq multiplied almcJst SSl>: 
mid 197()S, and alrrtost doubled again aftet·- the Soweto UjJrisinqs to 
r··eact·l ~2.6 billior1 ir1 1983. 
h1J LUrlzy'/ 
-·-· 
L ::::;, l··-lu1 . ..1.qht eon~ up. 
Ma~:ge-tlaq DIJtpos;ts 




() '! d.rl c! (~nn ;~-:;t."!i drn.:::tn ;::.nd 1'--IE·!\',:·,l. 
CE:ipi ti::l.l ( l·\h.':!::s t pen·- t , L:t :: L_ a \~<-.1 V'" E' 11 C: E~ 
s \_/ !:::- t. (·:-;;iii ,, 
·i n<::1nc:i. al Ir1stittJtior1s E~amj_rlation Cour1cj.J., Statistical 
F E~ c:l t-::~ 1"- :':l J 
n E.~ J E~ ,~ ,,,; (~.~ ., 
PoL1rir1g irlV853trnerlts primarily into factorj.es, by the J.rJ-/Os, 
·r1·1ey p~·ovided capital·-·interlsive 
l·;::·o:hnuiqupi:c tu i:lt.<:i.Ji:l bd<::>ic lndu.•:ct,··ir:esvl . .! .. ~>. +:~.r-rn<::. Itl·c 
[i(:,:.•nr-?.r· d.l 1'-'lotur· ::::. dnd F'cJI' d ~ trJqF:'t.tl~.::>r·· v;~:l t.h l-'Jt-:~st [iE~rrnan at.r.to compi:.'-~.ni t-::··c:~. 
'i 1 r··m-:::; shipped ca~ and true~: parts for assembly in LJ.S.-owrle(J 
IBM arld Burrc~wghs played a leading rcJle i11 bLAilding up !3outh 
nu.mbF~r- uf skillrE~d tt-Jhiti':.:: VJGI'-I:er··~:. t.o c:ontr··ol -:J.nd !::".upE'I'-vi::~-E~ j_ndu::.,tr-'/ 
1/J:i. th dir-r?!ct m:i.l :i.t:,:.-1.1·y· i.mpl ic::,J.tion:::;~ tr··.::~.n~~;n;::l.tiunD.l c::or-pol·-,:::ttinns 
l\lD.mi b :i a .. plentiful tJra11ium. 
c:i.t: ... , pi:·:~.r··t: I .I. .. 
l""he lJ.S. fi1~m~ Westinghouse, owned 15 pe~cent o1 
the sha~es ar1d supplied tl·1e t1asic technology to the f"rer1ch 
,_:::0rl~3or··t::i.un:, F~-~,··,·::~tnE:l.t:omE·::•,! tht::~t hu1J.t ~3C.JUi:.:h 1~1+r··:i_,_:2. ·~; b:i.CjqE~~~t. l"lUC:lE.•<:·:\r·· 
r·nr'·!F'I .... q-1 ... , .. ,t \116/·,,/ l_j __ ,,,,,. !· .. ··(.:1. v 
proved fFu:itle!55~, IJ.S. and British oil ·fi.rms c:ontj_ntJed ta ~·e·fj_ne 
o:i.l pi'"'Dcluc:ti un fl 
South A-frica j_mpur-t oj_]_ secr·etlv, eva1jj_ng OF~EC's sancti[JflS. T h t'.-!\' 
(1 u .. ~~Q f].r··in, F"luor··~ manaqr.-~d t.hF.:.:_. c:.:::.nstl .... ut:t:iDn o+ South 
g~owth enab:led SotJtll AfFica to do11li11ate 
r--,~om tht:?i r· r-t:-:-ql. ont:l.l hea.dc~uc:l.l"t.E;•I' .. ::::. 1 n 
\1<"0.1 U.E:\I::J 1 E~ 
f'ish fri:Jm Namibia; cop~Je~, 11ickel and diamon(js from B13tswar1a; 
Ll'lJrr c1re, sugar·, c:itrLts fruit!; anc1 woodpuliJ ·fron1 Swazilar1d~ 
L6. E:<I.Jerts t1elieve ~lCJl1t1··1 Afr·i1::a alr·eadv 
r:~f·'!V.. [)C\\iiC:! 1""·1-:::t:::;l<:;l_il'l, ll'fhr-:;.~ Fin<:J.ncinq D-f 
F'r-CJ!Jir·,;:;_romt-:-'! ... 11 i··.Jut_:(·::-'!~::; ·J_nc! Duc:U.fllf-:-:·~nt-;::; •1 1\lt:-!\.'.J 
ArJartheid, Maru 191~11 
:1.0 
h as nt.r. 1 : 1 c::: ,:;;_ r.. 1_,v F' ,::1_ p ("} n r,;:. ( ~::; (:7.• P 
south A·frica'~~ !~1..1clear 
Yur--k :; l.JI\1 C;E'!ntr·E: (.)na.:i. n~;:;t:. 

c:itr-us fruits, tea and 
rnanlAfactured ouptut, both within the SolJth A-frican Custorns Unior1 
\0·''c:l to thc· 
c.OlAntries beyond~ blocki11g their effor·ts to industrial.Ize. 
perpetL!ated the tl1e under·development which 1·orced hundreds cJ·f 
::_:,tJ.b·-··c:E"::ntc!r-. Thc0 r .. ,:Jc:i~:.t idE~Dlog';/ t.lnc!E~r··pinninq -:3.p<~\l'""'t.hE:~id 
repressi.ve ;tate capi.tal.i.st r·egime whicl1 coerced the black 
ti-le surpluses that enabled the wh:ite minority to l.ive at levels 
state bcll!r·ldar·ies mer-elv ser·ved to conceal the spread of 
l.E3. 1~o1·- an analysis of this 1~elatior1ship. see A11n 
F~otJts oi Crisi!; ir·l Soutl1ern Africa fl-1~er1to1··1q N.,J. 
F'l'"'l7'::::i·:::;, -fu1··· U;-~+a.rn nmt::~r-·:i.ca, 190-4). 
l :l 
~Jcc:·idrn3n ~ The·:> 
(1-fr·· i c.,;·,l. !rJor .. ]. d 

As SoLtth Africa inten!:ified its domination over southern 
A·t:~11::a~ tl1e people of the reqion mobilized to libel~ate 
fhe guerilla mcJvemer1ts w~1ich 
political n1ovemer1t on t~1e continent, the rC~+t-·i can 1\lc.t:.:l Clr'l.C:).l 
c:clr'l91"0SS of SoLtttl Africa~ helcj its foundillQ I:OrlV8fltiol-l ill 191 
~levertheless, tt1e formation of 
yreate~ souther·rl Ai:r·ican demands for- freedom, initiating a 
L_ac~: of s~Jal:e prol1ibits a full e}~plorat:lon of all the 
Ins1:ead, tl-lis sec:t:io1·1 
+ ,:~!o: :u.~ .'E~~::; on the c<:':l.u.-:~.:-:,~s; o+ tile· c:! :i. -f + i c:u.l t i E·S E~ncountE~r-f:. .. ~d b''/ thE' 
to r·emold tt1e int1erited r1ational political ec:onomies which had 
.~ 
D11 tt·1is basi~5, see~:s to identifv the 
1 ..•. : 

·tl1e Wo~ld Bank·s conventional wisdom: E:<pand export 1:rops and 
i.ncreJse education and scJcial services; 
e·f·fec:ts wi1.l spread development throuqhotJt the nation. F't···e~::;i dE~nt:. 
bLll1.c1ir1g ten-hous;e c~e]ls in every community as two-way chanr1els 
cJt cotrtmunicatJ.orl +r·cJin the grassroots to tt1e national 
Efforts to e:<pand e>:port c:rops succeeded~ 
WlJrlrJ pr·ices reducecJ tt1e ccJuntry's foreign e~;chartge earrtings 
F'urthermor·e~ 1n 1966, in 
Gt1ana, a coup, ·folllJW:ir1g a precipitous drop 1n cot:oa pri!:es, 
Closer· tc1 hotne, while offic:ially deplcJring tl1e 
!.9.. Cf.. t'::l~ ~ 1\l:i.tnt:.;~ ~ ''l1-:-::r·~ Hou.sc~ C:.t:!!ll ! .... r..:::oadi-::·!r··~~-; t:.i.s; E:l.n IndE:>~ o1 
Polit::i.cdl ChE:~nqE•: "The· C~asc:.- o+ D,::\qamoyo~'' J.FQ U'Ba.l'""r·· ''T(.~f'.IU [(·211-:::; 
::":ind rhc:-:~ir- 1E·E:l.ci!~:·:·I''"~S~ The:· Pa.r··c; Ca:::;E!,'' <J.nd .J .. ~=:i:":\fTI~U++ 1 '?~CJE~nt~:::~ o+ 
Ch,::~.nqt:·:~~ C:t:-::·11 L .. ;;:;,·,::\dE.:-1''"<.::, in a.n urb,"::\n b(·::?tt:i.ng,'' papE~r-~-:, pr~esr.::tnr::'ti to 
tl1e A·fr1car1 Studi85 A5;sc1ciation, :l4tll Ar1nual meet:i11q~ ~lov. ~J~ 
J.9.71, J)enver, Colo . 
. 20 .. See Ar\rl Se1c1man, Gt1ana's Deve1.opment Experience, 19~1-l'){,6 
(1'-~,J.i.r·-·r::Jbl: F:c:~~::;t (::i-fl.-.:i.C:E•.n F't.t!]JJ.sh:i.nq l·-lcJUC::if::0-~ l.c;-.>H) p.,;·,l.£.;~;irr: .. 
l 

Llflllateral declar-ation of independence tJy SO!Jthern Rhodes1az's 
whjte minority, tt1e 8rit1.sh and their western al.lies r·efL1;ecl t!J 
ta~e de·finit1ve ac:tion to insL1re ar1 early and peaceful t.Fansitlol, 
lr1 1 1?6~7, tt1erefoFe, Tanzania's leaders toc1k steps to as~;er-t 
d:Lrec:t control over the national 'commanding heights· t.he han!·:~:; 
.,· ,-,··11! '"" +· , •.. 1. P,.\~:; \r:;. 1 / 
.. \ •..•. :::J ..• --· v This required massive reorqanizat1on 
·\ th(·:'-~:;:.c; :i.r·,~::.1::.:i.tu.tion:5 tiJ dir··,~:~(:t in\lf?::'~:;t.rnE~nt t(:l cr··p.rJtinq 
' 
mclr··e !Jroductive employment opportLJnities and r·aisinq livinq 
pt·udt.l.c::t.:i.'-li.ty :i.n ,:::l.(Jr··i.c::t.!lt.u!'··;::.:.~ ... pr·odt.tc::i.n-;:;~ Cl.-·:i.t::i . .-:.::":1.1 tool~::; {':\nci 
c:l:i.!--·c·c:tic)n~ 
::;c· J c·c t ion 
at appropri.ate levels o·f techncJlogy ar1d cortsumer 
In their second ·five year plan, the planners did 
1\1·/CI'"·;;;:.·r··t::-:·.1 ''.ThE'· (1r·u~~;h-:-:\ 0E:'c:lal'""at:iun: ~?9 ,J,::tnuar-y.! 1'/t:./.,'' a 
from W1-itir1ws a1,d Speeches, 1965-1967 (Dar es SalaaAl: 
CJ;.::·fci!'-c:! Un:i.vc~·r-~::>:i.ty F'1···p-:~,~i~ li:fbF;), ppM 
:~~u FcJr- discussion c1f these, see Ann Seidman, PJanr1ir1g for 
[)evelc1pmer1t ir1 8LAlJ-Sat1ar·ar1 Afr·ica (New York: Praegerq 19.7'~; ar1d 
Da1- es Salaam: Tanza11ja Publishing H!Juse, 1974) passimM 
Rept.!blj.c: CJf rarlzania, 
Gover1-1ment Printer, 196 1?). 

spee1 fy social c'i te.-i a~ They 
partially decentralized administration of development programs, 
primarily for social fac1lities and economic infrastructure. 
They failed to prepare carefully-designed physical and financ1al 
plans for industries and agricultural projects which, implemented 
over time, could initiate chains of planned growth in every 
region. Invited to produce an industrial strategy, a Harvard 
team produced a list of options, but offered little in the way of 
long term plan perspectives or recommendations to involve the 
people in implementing their proposals. The government's efforts 
to rebuilt foreign and internal wholesale trade to support more 
self-reliant development bogged down. 
In its efforts to 1mplement the Arusha Declaration, however, 
the government expanded the inherited parastatal sector, 
bestow1ng considerable power on its managers. Not infrequently, 
t!.. SQ.; l'--<~~~' their interests diverged from national goals. 
'(' t~ 
Reliance on 
,;· '-_r .) foreign partners for capital , technology, and technical e}: perti se 
') . 
r.i" • (t r.,.,.-t· 
"" ~~ \: 
cc-
fostered th1s tendency. While perhaps not as widespread as 
elsewhere in the third world, parastatal corruption began to 
appear. 
The Tanzanian government introduced measures to curb this 
24. See R. B. Seidman, State, 
Croom-Helm, 1978>, Ch. 21. 
Law and Development <London: 

':ldnCJE'r··v;l (\ leadel'·c;hip cCJde 
~Jr!Jhihite,J qover·r1mer1t ar1d par-ty leaders fr-om er1qaqi11q 1n pr··ivate 
Nationalization of rental housinq restricted 
cJpportLtnities ·for· spec:ulative real estate investment. 
f~e!Jrganization (Jf tt1e nationalized banks pertnitted, not only 
fJrcJjects" bLAt also 2 sytem~.t1c checktJp on the use of national 
1nve~table sut·pltJse 
.:::..nd i.nciividu::~.l:;;. The party published guidelj_nes desiqnecj tel 
faf~ilitate ~orker- parti!:ipatiorl. 
[3ee~:ing to restrLACttJre an inherited externally dependent 
i:).c:l rn i n :i. :::; t 1· · -::3. t ion 
aqglome1·ations of capital and the capital-interlsive technologies 
leaves oliqopolistic, often foreigr1~ p~ivate inte~ests, seel~:i.ng 
to rtla:~imizc p~ofits~ to per-petuate e:<te~nally dependence and 
widesp~ead pove~ty. On the other ~land? inhel~tted bureauc~atic 
~;tate institLJticJn~; typ1cal:ly isolate 'experts' and 'mar1aqers 
~rom tt1e people's con(:erns . Color1ial der1iaJ. of edLtcation to 
.. :: ........ F:u.B .. ~3ch:O:l.+f,::;;;r··~ ''.fl···,e Dc~a.dlt:Jck in DE•\/elDpmE-~nt ~~clrninist.r··e:; •. t.:i.Dn*' 1 
1r·, L~ I_E;'/~::i ... c::d .. F'ol:i.tic::~; and c:h,J.nqt-? in Dc::-vc'2'lopinq c:·c-'' . ..l.nt.r··iE~s: 
~~tLtdies 1n the ft1eor·y ar1d Pr·act1ce of Development (Carnbridgc: 
1··F!J .. 

~'·fri.cans renders it difi:icult to involve wor~:ers ar1d peasants 1r1 
dec1dj.ng relevar1t issues. 
1·a11zar11ar1 families together V!Jlurltar·ily into Ltjamaa villages to 
ur1dertake collect·ive cl·-op CtJltivatj_on ar1d buil1i sc:~1ools, c:llnlcs 
.;,":l.ncl ot:.hc•1'·· ~:;o(:i<:-:..1 +<::tc:i.l:i.t:ir:~<.::;. Pr-esident Nyerere argued that by 
thE' 
~Jeasar1ts wouJ.d avoid rLtral 
Ir1 tl1e early 1970s, tt1e party ar1d goverr1ment sought to 
accelerate the peasar1ts' movement into villaqes. r~epor,..t. ::s o·f 
Criti(:s claime(J peasar1ts opposed cocJper-ative 
ct.rli::.:i.-../i:?.t:i.Dn .. 
l~ever-theless, a decade later· u_jamaaizatj_CJrl had c:learlv 
trar1sforrnecj tt1e social structure. i=--or example, in one remote 
plar·1tations. l1P to 250 families no lonqer 1n isolated 
~:?6 .. E: .. q. I .. t~)hivj:i .. , T"he !:lilt=·nt Cla~:::.:::; ~3ti'-u<_:_:_!•:.::!lE) in ·r,·::l.nz<::OI.nJ.a. i,f)_:).r· !.::?::~ 
~~l.~a1n: ·r·anzarlia Pt~bl.ist1ir1g HoLts~, 1974). ·rhe ··ranzanian press 
t1a ~epo~teci spor··adj_c alte1npts to punisl1 trar·\sgr·essor·s. 
J. Nyerere, Socia.L1sm and RtJral Dt:-:~\.it:~ 1 op fH('':'rl t: 

hotnPsteads --- 1.ived ir1 cornnlLArlities equipped with water taps, 
!~Ct1ools, clinics ar1(J post officesu Ten ~1ouse cells electecJ 
~epr··ese11tat1vPs tcJ village cour1cils. Villager·s still maj.r1ly usecf 
;:our·•cj.ls ar1d district leaders soug~1t to bring comrnurlity--owned 
1""!-lfC~ +.:Jbr··ic:: C:)-f tht-::! vilJ.aqc·::!J'""!::;' J.i\-'f?~; and '!:JOC:iaJ. E~{periE::'r!CE.::' hi0.d 
tr·aditi!Jns dogged tt1e villagers' efforts~ f"~iJ thouqh ~'\!omen 
ten c0ll leaders or· on vi1.lage cotJncils. (.)~:; vi 11 ag(-2r···::. put 
.Ltltivation of their owr1 plots first, attempts to encoLAragc 
~olle(:tive work to acqu1re oxen and i11crease productivity 
LJr\for·ttJnately, as the u.Jamaaization accelerated, drot.tght 
spread thrDLAghout East Africa, drastically ~educing cr·op 
pr--c:Jclu_c:t :i. un ~ 
Then~ Uganda's Idi Amin ir1vaded, 
gc)ve~nmer1t to borr··ow still m11re. Reflecting the interr1atio11al 
28. See OM ~(aly3Jya, K. Mt1lar1ga, J. Sea1boja, 
Aid Work:? (-·rr-erlttJn, N.J.~ Afr·ica World Press~ 
r·epiJrt of 1983-5~ [Ja~t:icipatol·-y evaltJatj_ol~ 
Dar· e~; Salaa1n University students lived 
3nd A. Seid1r\an~ Does 
fol--thcomj.nq) fDr·· l::t 
pr·c)jE~ct. in J..AJh.ich 
and t-"-Jor-J:E'd ltJit:h 




The gover-nment r-e.iected the 
1:r1ternatior1al Monetary Fur1d <IMF t:. y p :i. c:: -:·,,_ 1 I r .. l F=- p ct c k .::,,_ q ~::::· o t· 
'cor1ditions' so the IMF denied :it furtl1er cr-edit. 
c:umlnE:r··ci~::\1 bani:~~-; follc:)hll-?c:! ~:;u.it ... F1Jreign e:<change shor···taqe~s 
fDI'-c:t-:~d ·::;c~vc:'r-1'_.:~ l:t.lt.:bE:tck:~; in irnpc:)r'-ted m;,:\c::h:i.nt::!t--·y, equ.i.pment and 
mat~rials reqLtj_r·ed by urban fac:tor~ies ar1d tcJ transport qocJdc- tcJ 
Operating at a fr-a!:tion of capac:ity, 
:i. l"l C:l t l ~:~- t !'' l F~ :::~ 1 ;:,\ :i. c:l D ·-f --f- VJ Dr-- k (-;:-:· r-·- ,_;;; " 
e:-;port crops to earr1 n1ore foreign ·"" ·-t· ,,,,-1~ ,·:)' I L ,._ ~... , ,___ t,._ r:.:- ~~r .. 
I 
·rh\-:-:: fr·-u::~.tr-,J.t.ic:Jn CJ-f T·E~.n~·::<::i.n:i.iJ 's t:::;;.--l:+{JI'"t:~; u.nciE-~r---~::::cor-(·.-::.·-G1 tht-:-:· c::omplE:::x 
nature of the transitior1 towar-ds socialism in poor under·developed 
1 ":> l'\-' r. ••,. I 
In tt·fr--ic::E:l.~ .,::~. cc-:ntt.ll'-'/ D-f c:nlr::tni,:-:tl, di-~~~r·upt..£i:o~l o.*-c..-JLll"ltl'--i (·:'!::::. 
,. 
pr·odLtctive capac:ity and lLKk C"J·f- D. C (]rl ~>C: 1 DU. S 'I un:i.+j_ed ~·-Jor-king 
2~ FoJ·- details, see ~Japer-s preser1ted at a wor·~:stllJp sporlSClrecl bv 
t.hc':· [c:c•num:i..-:::;::-; h:c~~::;c~Etr"'ch E-:u!-E'.:OEtu, Uni\/E:::~;;it\1 o-f Dz::~.r- E·::; ~:::;.;,l_la.E:l.m., lcif34 .. 

It is easy for foreigners to 'armchair' theorize. It seems 
more useful, however, to engage the people, themselves in 
examination of the detailed evidence to discover the causes of 
the problems. Only then can they, themselves, devise more 
effective solutions'-3(..( Tanzan1a's experience v· ~ d·.f~ , .. ,t., 
underscores the necess1ty of 1nvolving the workers and peasants 
at every level in a systematic step-by-step process of 
restructuring of inherited in key areas to ensure: 
1> the machinery of state to ensure it encourages and 
responds to the needs and interests of an increasely 
united urban working class and the peasants; 
ii> the commanding 
'modern' sector --basic 
reshape the pattern 
allocation to achieve 
economy; and 
heights' of the so-called 
industry, trade and finance --
of investment and resource 
a more balanced, integrated 
iii) the rural social structure engages the peasants 
1n 1ncreasingly conscious cooperative efforts to 
improve the1r productivity and raise the1r own living 
standards. 
But social change takes time. Educating cadres and creating 
new institutions to meet ever-changing situations is a slow, 
contradictory process. M1stakes are inevitab le. What is 
crucial is the institutionalizat1on of two-way channels of 
30. This proposition seems born 
participatory learning process 
Aid Work, op. c1t. 
out by the experience of the 
reported in Kalyalya et al, Does 

cJmn!ur·Jic0tion to correc:t those mj.stakes so tt1at over time~ 
-~tep--by-step, the esse11tial char1qes will take place. 
Mozambique's efforts to 
the coinple~ities o+ tra1·1sition. Historic:a!ly, Mozambique·s 
~omcwhat neglec:ted Brj_tish pr·atectorate, attained independer1c:e :Ln 
1.(?(,2 with relatively litt.l.e struggle. 1-he people of MozarnbiClLte 
r~r-e:limo created new state !;trwct.Ltres ir1 the rural norther-n 
Th~'::!Y 
worn~~~-~ at every J.eveJ. o·f decisiorJ-·making i11 the village goverr1ir1g 
~:::1.~ ~::;E'•·:'~~ f?..(J •• 1 PtllE:·n F· .. .::,tnd F:.<Jr··h.-::tl'"·,;;t I~:.dD.cm<·::tn, 1 .../o;.:~ambiqu.c:·~ F1····(Jm 
c CJ 1 Dn :i. ,::;.] J :srn 1.:: u Ft·::·VC:) 1 u. t i on ., 1 t)()O·····l '?El2 .. ( Bot.J. :\. d t~r·· ~ Co:: i;o,Jf:"'!~:c. t. v:i. (:?~t-J 
F'l--r:>=~;-:::: .. 1 l'7'FJ:.~:) ,;·,tncl B.:~;,, .... , .... y 1···1unslCJ~"\I~ l"lu-z:arnbiqt.tE~·~ l""h(:·::' F:~::~•v'CJJut::i.on ,;:1.nd 
It·c:=.:. Lir··iq:i.n',:. (f\lc.:.;.t-\1 \'or··k~ .Orl(JiHF.:<.n 7 lc?e:::~.). 

peasa1~ts to organize com1nurlal villages. lhese mar1aqed to produce 
enoL1gt1 to feecl tt1e liberated zone populatior1s ar1d even to p}~port 
~::;:n·::i.Jl i::'lmounts o+ c:1·op!:::. tu ht:::lp finance~ tht:::· impor··t o·f ma.nu.+z:,(:t.u.r·e>cl 
(·::-• ::: ;::; (c::· n t :i. a l ~::: " 
clut.hinq ;;·~nd -:;:):i. Hlpl E·?! huu-c::.f..":~ho1 d 
~::;up p 1 i ·::-.? <;;:. " 
···.CiitJE:' c1-f tht::~ ri(:C:!\-'·J pr--odu•.:t.i '-/P ,::tncl ',:;ta.t.e i n::::.ti t.:u.ti on~:;; net:·de:·~d tc::; 
How t(J restore prociLtctivc 
tJ-iE? cDuntr·'/<.:::.J.cle: t:.o pr·nvidt~ +ood ~=":!.rid 1···c,i~·J mE:tt.:E~J··ial;;;; fc)J·- thE· c:i.t.i.e:~~~, 
tr·anspor·t ·f0cilities and estates near Mapt.!to ar1d Beir~·~ 
1---lnr,,r to 
al~rlt_~all_y to So1~tt1 A·fr1car1 m1nes, and had lost interest in 

agriculture? To further complicate matters, because of its 
(.I.e..-.. ~ t.fv--')~1~ 
support of the Zimbabwean Patriotic Front, the newly independent 
government faced the constant threat of invasion and massive 
destruction by the Rhodesian regime. Mozambique ' s decision to cut 
off the Rhodesian transport routes to the sea in conformance with 
the United Nations boycott, alone, cost the new government almost 
$200 million a year in fore1gn exchange earnings. 
During the first months after 
independence, the government strove to maintain bas1c services 
and produce necessities while beginning to take over 
and reorganize the inherited governmental structures. E:<cluded 
from decision-making in the 
past, committes of workers managed 
as best they could to bring back into production industries and 
estates abandoned and partially destroyed by the Portuguese. 
They struggled to restore transport, mak1ng necessary repairs of 
vehicles sabotaged by departing owners. In Maputo, tens of 
thousands of former squatter-compound dwellers moved to suburban 
type houses -- left by departing Portuguese enjoying running 
water, electricty, and clean airy rooms for the first time in 
their lives. Voluntary campaigns made Maputo one t 
32. The two previous ones took place during the war itself. 
"1? 

MaF·:-:ist ·Lcr·1inist vangLAa~d·-type of party, Frelimo ci-Jarted a 11ew 
coLA~se for the count1··v: the stage of the People's Democr·at1c 
tl-te leading t:].ass, tt1e wor~:ers, would constitute tt1e pcJlitical 
for···::t::· · Thf~~ F'-::0\l·-tv <:;~.ime:•d t:CJ ''+r-·f-:.'E' th1-::· pt::'!.;:\:0::-<::\nt::l +r··om the:: 
·./ulu.nt:.'::i.l'""ily in hi.:]hE:·I' .. -fnr·1n::,; o+ pr·uduc:t:lon ,·,:tnd collecti\-·E~ lifc·Q '' 
ar1d ir·1tell.ectual.s, rnar1y of whom :lived 1n southern Moza1nbique, 
l~lLit icie tt·1e or·bit cJf tl1e l:iberati.on war .. 
As its economic baseq .he F~eople's Democr-atic Revolutior1 ai111ed 
ThE-: 'fhj_j'"'d 
C:cJnqress OL!t:lined as itS ob_jec:tives: 
~Arj er1d to foreig11 domi11atior1 ar1d ti-le consequerlCE!5 o~: 
tradi·tional-·feuda] and capitalist-colon:ial rLAle; 
:-<:·[;-:: t C::•n :::;. j_ on o-1· cl E-:mUL 1'"- i::l tiC:: p E'Op J (~~ ':::; :::; t i'"'I . ..I.C -{:-_ U.l . E~~~; 
thr-uuqhc:lui: ·tr·,F2 c:CJUI"')tr--\,... t:o in\/Ol\iL' thE.• 'bJ~o,~":\.d J.,!:J.hoJ-lnq 
rilasses· ir1 de(:i!3ion-··tnakll'1Qq as tt1e fcJLAndatiorl o~ a r1ew 
form of state power-; 
':::~tr·u.(Jql (-:2 on 
people's basic r1eeds 
thertroduc:tion fro11·t 
for food~ cl1Jtt1s; 
to 
~ ,x , .. 0 ., , .. , ... , ..... ·t·· .• ···:··.-::/ 
t.IL I (-::-.ll .. ;,(-.~, C..-:·:.p<:.L.L . / .1,<7 
~~3. 11ozambiqt.Ae lnf:(Jrftlaticlll Agency~ BLtllet:illS 
~:MarlLtto: Special Congr·ess Isst..1e. 
No. r ... Jo • .! (_) 

r·he r1ew gcJve~nme11t exerted direct over t~1e economv's 
'' ( :otnrn<:,lncli rl'J hr-:::•:i. ght.:~~ ''" T,·::tJ.::i ng step;;::: to !'""(:?OJ'" C.Ji::tni ;;-~E~ i ndu~::;tr l c•:::; 
abandoned by the F)or··tuguese, :it negotiated to cont i nu.e 
opGra·tions witt1 f(Jr·eign o~~necl f'ir-ms wt1ose mar1agers r·emair1ecj. It 
gr-adLtally placed the eJltire baJ~J.::ing and financial instittJtior·lal 
1 ;:;- -.ru. lt also sought to cor1trol foreign and internal wholesal.e 
t.1·-:·.:\dE• tcJ r-c-:c.i:i.r·i-:::ct t:.J,...,::,_dE• t:o fTif.:!E~t ti-·IE::> nr:::!c•c!:::> of the m~::i.:;;;~:;r:::::; u+ pc~·c;.pl\::,• 
tl~r·oughout the countr·y, instead of the LtJXtJry consLtmption demands 
of the rich in MapLtto and Beir-a_ 
To recor1str1.ACt the inherited state a11d private strLrctures 
.:.ln·l::.r·I:JJ.l:i.n';J thc:~·::;c.:-: c:r-·.i.ticc)l ~::>c.•c:tnJ'":~;~ F·J .... c.•limo h,td t:o C:l'""f?at::,:.~ 
qtJalitatively di·fferer1t ~·:j.nds o·~ institutions +rom those it had 
r3JJltal inter1sive mac:hinery ar1d eq1Jipn1ent 1n the 'modern 
sop~listicated compJ.P:{ institutionsa 
iJ··1st:itut1ons contr-ibuted to, J~ather tl-lan ~·1ir1ctering~ esser1tial 
esser1t101 commtAnication. 

W!11l0 the ·rhir·d ionqress proposed formulation and 
lfniJlementat1or1 o-r i··1ar·mor1ious~ planned economic developmer1t 
cloverr1ment ar1d peoples' organi~ations in reality ren1ained in the 
r1eccessarv statistic3l infor·n1ation 
~Jilrtv en1phsized voltJiltar·y formation of cooperatives alor1g tt·1e 
Jil'lt:::·',;::, o+ cc:Jmrnunc:tl ·· . .~ill.:::tqE~:::; in t"hc: llhE·r~;;:tt.•: .. ?d z.c:inr::::~.:. .. 
Fr··elitno proposQd a new f1sc:al r-eglrne to accompany tt1e phys1c.aJ 
·i_t--lc::r--E·-:::t.~si.ng l'Ul('.:'! :i.n i'I"IOb:i.1:i.::~:i.nq ;;:tnd V"f:0'invc:-::;ting c.::..pita.l .. 
•JJ.st:~ibut:i.on of income .. State bank1ng and financial irlstittJtions 
profits would pr·c1vide a growing sourc:e oi· 
ajn1ed to ct·eate conditior1s r1ecessary to dignify worK a~ the 
)_ t. 

f:Jartv aimed to eliminate ur1employmer1t, cr-eate and dynamize 
dor1e, encouraqe soc:ia:lis;t emtJlatltJn to incr·ea~e prodiJCtivity . 
. T.hr·ough rapid trair1ir1g and specta:Lized c:ourses in all 
ind1 .. 1.:::;t:1'··:i.D.1 -f-J.I'"m:::; ii:l.nd coupc:::~···::Jt:i...,./E~:::~., thE• f:J;;·:;.r-t.y ~;Dught t:o ql.vE.• thE: 
wc,rl<illQ cl2ss esse11t1.al poJ.j.tical, techrJicai and scienti-fic 
It leade~s emphasized the 1mpcrtance of emancipating 
~·'J f.) m t-::·: n .. fhey gave pr-lor-t·ty to spreadi.r1g prever1t:ive medi!:ine 
t:.hl'··c::.t.J.i~Jhou.t thE! CDI...I.nt!····-_./~:.idr-:-::·, r··_-::l.th!:.:::r- than hu.i ldinq t::~>:.p(?l"lS:-1\/t-::O 
uf t~·1e formtAlattnrl of tt1e New Mar1, fr-ee fron1 obscurarttistn ar1d 
cap.~hle cJf assimj.lati.ng criti.1:al.l.y tt1e politj.cal, Sc1entif1cq 
T~1e next five year·s~ l1owever, pt·oved the difficulties 
~·1amped attaime11t of tl1ese IJDals 11·1 a countr .. y le·ft bv cal.orlJ.al. 
r-1.1.1 E~ qv us;~:;].';/ uncif2f"'"dF::vo::=:'.L opE:·ci a.nd t'.~>~tt-:!l .... !"l€:1.1 J y depF:.•ndE~nt. c:CJn·t r .. ·ont.E:·d 
c)r~pc:)r~,,_t·:~. c:in::::; 




fac:t!31~Ies, trading instittJti.ons and ban~:s~ espec:ially w:itt1out 
i"l"l-::·:...::hi nc:~1, .... .,. 2•.nd c·qui.pin!:?nt fol'"" the:.· :i.ndt.t·:;t:_r-1<::<.1, t!.-o.n~~:;por-t a.nc:l ~~: .a.·l.c.: 
Heavy e>:~lenditLAre~; on state +arms, ·formerlv 
fJrLvate PorttJguese commercial es;tates~ failed to raise 
1..._ '::l.c:!-·: u·f c;;·,tdr·l-:-:-~ ~ + :i. r--:-::.-l.nc::c~ * :·::,_1-)d tr--:::\n:::~por-t:. t.o a~::;-:::;1 :::; 1..: 
peas2nts to e:<pand ct~ltj_vatlon and market crops, whether- on a 
ccJntributed to a dec:li11e 111 0-ood 
Ir1 the 1980s, a three year dr·ougt1t 
~~~t~let·s f1.oclds an1J typhoor1s destr-oyed crops and livestoc~~ 
C) t" :::1.1 :i. ·1_-.:. h :i. •:;:. ,, ',,, •. ,,,., ,, .. ,, .. 11<::: ' 
... .. .. -t,.:"'' 
,:":i.i l .,-.-,,_nd r·c::oc::;.d 
transport, burned crc1ps ar1d storaqe faci1.ities~ and 
! .. , ?':C.)·--· (:~ 1 .. 1 1 .• , 1.,1 ,._._, ·1 \ -:~; o:::; I ...... ----' ---- v 
Ir1 1984, finally bowing to Soutt1 Afric:an and Ur1ited States; 
~4. Orig·i11ally estatll:i.!stled by Smith s 1-eqime to destroy 
MozamtJiqLAe SLApport for t!1e Zimbabwe itJeration struggle, the 
Nati.JI-·lal Res;is·tar1ce Movement cJbtai!led Soutt·1 Af1~1ca t~c:ti!:0J. anc·l 
militar··y sup~Jor·t ·for ccJntinLAed destabilization at !1(Jzambique 
after Z:trntJatJwe a1:~1ieved ir1depender·1ce. 
~:5. bee Seidrnar1, Ti1e 




pressures, Frel1mo s1gned the Nkomati Ag r ee~gn-t. The Mozambique 
government pledged not to allow the African National Congress of 
South Africa operate out of its territory in exchange for an end 
to South African support for the MNR. The United States, 
howev er, sh1pped food aid and promised to assist the private 
agricultural sector~ 
Calling for foreign investment and technology, Mozambique joined 
the IMF. This opened new lines of credit from the West. u.s. 
firms renewed their exploration for oil. What its sh1ft to closer 
ties with the West might portend remained to be seen. South 
Africa secretly continued to send the military equipment to the 
MNR. 
Angola's early efforts to implement 
a socialist transformation essentially parallelled Mozambique ' s. Two 
major factors differentiated the subsequent course of 
development: First, Angola, with more rich though only partially deve 
resources, had a stronger economic foundation. Despite U.S. 
refusal to recognize the new Angolan government, the U.S. firm, 
Gulf 011, negotiated a satisfactory arrangement to continue to 
pump oil from its valuable Cab1nda wells. This provided an Important 
36. Hanlon argues U.S. aid specifically sought to dera1l efforts 
to achieve a socialist transformation in the countryside. (See 
Josph Hanlon, "Stealing the Dream," New Statesman <Britain > , De. 
19, 1984; and his book, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire. 
London: Zed Press, 1984. 
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Secor1d, possltJly bec:ause of 
Na1nibiar·1 and SotJt~l Afr:ican liberation, ~3outh Africa r-epeatedly 
In 19.76, as South A-frica's arn1ored troops rlear-ed the 
c: .. !.p:i. Lui'\/ A11gola requested CutJan assistance k' 
\7 l·'J'" l l · tr <H u.rH.•cl c•>.n cl 
2:·-1ned wit!1 mode1·1-l wea~JDilS~ tt·1e CutJarl soldiers helped tEJ dr-ive the 
protec·t and rebuild t~1e f:ledglirtg Ar·1qolan state. 
aid to L.J~!ITA~ the South African supported an-ti-government 
~7. Al-l i11vasio11 secretly st .. lPIJCJr-ted by the LJnited States; see J1Jt1n 
Stockw~ll, I11 Sear·c:h of· Enemies~ A CIA Story (New Yor~::: Nor·ton, 
l (~,-/.(3) • 
. ::;u.. The, cul::i.3n~::; ~ tr,1ho ~~;pe<::~.k ~)pa.n i :::;h ( ed~::;j_ l'l 
f~nrtlJguese spea~.:ing Angolans, t1ad pr·ovided 
aicJ (J1Jri1·1q t~1e war aqains·t ti-le Pt:Jr-ttJgt.lese. 
C:: [) ITI p ]•·· F.:• 1···1 C-? n d 1;;7.• c\ 
t. r- 2:1. i n :i. n g -:·:':1. n d 
cit. H Ch ~ {; D 
1-C). N12w Yor-~~ fiinE=~, ~lov • 
CJu.a.r·d:i.e::;_n (Ur-it,·::;.in) ~ 1\lc_;v~ 
. ,:_:.~ lCfH~);: '.3.nd 11 C:::l(l (:lj.d 





·fou~tt1 of its rLlr-al population up~ocJted, tt1ei~ c~ops 2r1d 
l:1veJ.J.hood destr·oyed, the Angolan gove~nment mobilized for war-
~-··J·:·~~.q:i.i.l(_:;j ,3. ;:;t:.r··u(_;jqlc~ ;;::,irnpl':l t.n kc~E~P thE' E·:c:unc:.rmy C:JDll""lQ and fc·:.·c::d t.he 
c:li the rtJling Popul.al~ Movement fcJ~ the L_iiJe~atiorl of Ar1goJ.a 
for tt1e 11ext five years to base its economic 
p ;::::; :1 :i. 1.::: \./ o n :: 
~-Givtng ab~~olute p~J.orlt)' to 
1··· E~ qu. i r·· emE~n t. ·::~ ;: 
the countl .... \/ ·· ~=· 
·*Acl1:i.e\·ir1g greate1·- production ef1:1c1er1cy ar1d improved 
s1.1pplies +or- the ~lopula·tion to guarantee ecor1omic and 
ocia1. statil:~z0tion; 
.,:,_ncl ma. t: c·r·· :i. C:t 1 f c:iu.n cl i::t t. i on:::; +ell .... econom:i. c: D.nd ~::;oci <::~.J 
*In view of tl1e war sitLJation, focusing 1n the soc1al 
~phere or1 solvi11g the problerns lJf cl·,j_l!jren, especia:Lly 
those ab0ndo1·1&cJ and orpt1aned; 
*Deifelopirlq ecorl(Jmic ar1cJ ·Fi11ar1cial austerity, 
iqcJI~o,Jslv cJppos1ng ur1justi·fied e;{~Jenditures and 
"''"'"L<-nq u+ ,--,_"'"uu,·c:e''''V 
(alld, altt101Jqh less 
cjetailed here, Angola s~ too) revealed the C(Jmple:< interact1011 ot 

country fro1n implernent1ng a scJcialist trans·f:ormation. L~CJt. h 
SLlffered t~1e added impact of hcJstile intervention by a more 
:i.ndl . .l.~:::.t:.l·i,J.li;-~c~d., rn:i.lli"::·J.r··:i.ly powc~t···ful., nc-:0iq1··1bur··p The:~ Unitc·cl 
States' role r··eflects the growing U.S. transnationals' interests 
1n tl1e t-egiorl" ad(Jing a global dimertsion to theii- efforts. 
··::······, 

movements, too, proposed to er1sure popular c:or1trol of their 
~--~atJ.on's rich prod\ .. tc:tive r·escJurces, promising to restore tl1e l.arl!j 
to t.:hP pt:-::-oplc::~ 
t-:.?-f+or-t~::> tu .::·:'\c:l!:i.E·Vt7! !'"i:':\c:lic:al t"""ec::on~::;tr·uc::t:.ion :i.r--1 Z.imbab~·Jey 
Cln Wll"lfllrlg irldetJendence, the voters overwt1elmi11Qly elected 
Zinli:Jabwe African ~l3ticJnal Llnion (/ANU) candj.dates~ and Robert 
l"he new gover·nment immedia·tely 
~~~·ised minimum wages and mtJltiplied expenditures ·for schools and 
It began to resettle some of the BtJO~OOt:' 
pt:-~..::·.~;-:::tnt.!5 Dn t.l"ic-? bc~~::;t:. h:J.l-f D+ t.he nE•.tj.un;;:\.1 +i:..~.~·--m land ::;till 
monopc1lized t1y 6000 wt1ite CDIIimercial farmer-s. 
tf'}..., T'l-ir::,• compr om1:::~e Lc:·:\l"lCEtSt(:-:·~1'.. 1·-!ou~::ftz~ CCJn:::;t::i.t_c.t"l.:::l.on c_~u,·:·:,.r .. ant:.E~E'cl •r, 
percent of the seats in Parliament to the whi_te mi.norj.ty for a 
(je(:ade; r--equir-ed heavy compensation f(JF ·t~le owner··s for· la1·1d or 
othe1~ assets nationa:lized; and provided a 'qolden handshake· for 
r·etir··inq w~\ite civil servant~s that rendered it too expe1··~sive for· 
tt1e 1·1ew qovernme11t tel entj_reJ.y repl.ace tt·1em~ 

a more d~veloped economy than any of the other three countr-ies_ 
the r·1cw Zimbabwe goverr1ment failed to make s~igr1if1cant structu1··a1 
At ever~· level of the bureaucr-acy, behind a screen o·~ 
o·fficials of the M1Jgabe government confronted instittJtionalized 
pre~ssLtr-es ar1d delays. E11dless ur1publicised committees ar11J 
conln11ssions buried propo~;als for e·ffective land reform a11ci 
bloc:l:t'?d E"+fc:il'··t~::; to :~;pu.r· t1···aciE~ u.n1Dn gr··ovJt.h t.o givce c:Drnmc~1··c1a.J. 
farnl and tJrban wol~kers a voice. Susceptible individuals recPl''ed 
~r·iot.ls ir1CP11tives to stlpport t~1e contj.nued stattJS qLto, 1r·lc1.ud1r1g 
local directorst1ips ir1 transr1ational c:orporate affiliates 
thc:i 1'". E• J E~C t. :l CJ!l vi ctcn·y ~ 
nll.rlister·s a11d tor1 ci~i1. ser·vants obtainec1 bank loans to buy brq 
hDl . .t.:::;t-::'~:; 1n the~ +ur .. rnt:ll ... ·ly vJh:i.t.e ::::.ubu.! .... bs u·f H~:::\r .. ;:'!l.r·t.·:~ .:\nd t:o E~nqa.(_]f:~ ir .. 1 
cc•romc•rcial. t;,,r···mir>q, l>nt••?l•", c:>nc:l C!tl···,r2r pr· .. u+ita.I:Jlc·? vr•::•nt>...<.r··c,,~ 
~ }~ A ~1ol1cy carried over with almost r1o change fr·om the 
rn:t nor .. :i. t·y :--·t-?qi f¥lf.7! .. 
~i· ·r·tle Zimbabwe affilate cJi the Sout~1 Afr .. ican mir1ir1g ·~:L11ance 
hotJse~ the Anglo American Grot~p~ played a leading role 1n ·finding 
the ·weat~ links· 1n the new government. As forergr1 capital. 
sougt1t to ·flee dL.t~ing the last few years of the liber·atiorl 
'::;t:l· .. ·uqcJll·::~~ (ingJo Plmc·r·i·::~o:tn h;,:~.d bouqht: cDnt~ .. ·oJ.l:i.nt.;J !::=.h,:;l.r·c~~" o+ lc::'E•.dinq 
fil~rJlS :i.r1 aliTtost every sector CJf tl·le Zimbabwean economy 
~ Jj.. l'c:;r· cJ e t '''· :i. 1 •::; of 
state rnachi11ery, 
Z i m h .:J. h ~·'J c::.• ., 
lCfEi.<l .. 
t~1e dif·t:ictJlty of restructuring Zir11lJabwe's 
:::.;E1 E~ F;:.B. ~:::;t-:-~idm<:::\n~, '1\),:·,\mibi.::\:: L.E1 ~::;::;;on:::; ·from 
presenteci to the UN NamitJian lr1st1tute~ LLAsa~:a, 

1-t,e new governmer1t did rlot even try to capture the sizeable 
lci(:a.ll·/···--qc·nE·t"-i:ltE•d invt.·?~::.t.::;.blt-~ surplu:;; ·-····-- ,:~_lmo·::;t f2 billion in 
l'7'H1 .... .--::i.lD!'lt-:0!. F~ursui.rlq conventional wes;ter-n advice to cre3te ar1 
hrJspitable investment climate, it left the inherited ta:-~ svstem 
l::.r- ,;;-,_n~::;r i<::i.-1.::. :i. on,·:·:-..1 cc1I'--por--a.t.E· a.+ ·f i 1 :i. ,::\tt::.•s to !'"t-?m:i. t horne ha.l-f thc·i r- ,D_+ tc~r--
Tr··E:i.n~s+E~rr· pr·1c:1ng ::;iphonE~d ou.t i:·:tnothel'- :t::?~}O- ::::;oo 
cni11iun .. Yc0t. ·fur .. t.::.·iqn invt.-:~~~;t_rJr·~::- br-uuqht il-l bar--c-:1\-' :;:~:?~.'j m:i.1J lOI'i 1n 
nt-::::·(•\' c:::::~.p:i.-I:.::J.l in th•:::::· -f:i.l·~;t t-c·li:':J.tivr-::.·1'--/ pr--o::::,pt-:~r--clu.s year-, a.nci lt:-:·:·::::-:::, a~:; 
I" h r:.:1 •'"·'· .. ·· , ... , .. , r·-- ,. ,· ;--- "" ,· +- 1 1 ·.:\·I·.,· ----,., cl ;;:..·t· "-"!' ... ,· ... ,,,. .. :j ·1-- ·-;;,,·j ,'1, 7/ 
.. _, 1 .... .. ...... .. ! .. .JI1I. ·- ... , ...... < ..... \..! ...... = .. L c. . .. L .. \.7"' 
T!-·:c::: cc:•:st·::. CJ-f the:::· E'>:pand:i. ng burf:?O.U(:r.-::•.c>y' c:1nd t.he e>~tc~ns:i. on o-f 
~oc:ial wel+are prcJgrams motJnted. As ir1 the neighborir1g cour1tr·ies 
~Jnuth ?i-fr·j_ c:an 
[JestatJilizaticlll plagt.Aed Zi1nbabwe. Ll11willir1g to raise cor·por·ate 
~Jj.tl1in tt1ree yea~s cJf attaining independer1ce, it ha1J t1~ pay ot .. tt a 
thil·-d of tl1e r1ation's ·fo1··eiqn exc:hanqe ear--nirlgs simplv to cover 
4~· l-t·1e Sn1itl1 r--egirne hacl pl·--otlitJited re1nitta1 .. lces of pr·ofit-~ t1~ ar1y 
'-f:i.l'lfl h::-:i.·:st':~·d in a cCJuntl'"'!' th.~1t.: cocnpliE~d t-·-Jith LJI\I :::.,a.nc:ti.on'~",. 
fl~, (:·1 r:::·c-:o·j dln::>n ''{:llt:i-C:·r--n,·::it:i.··-/f::·' Ut:)t:i.on~::; +or-- DI:·?VE'·lDI~)iTiE-!nt 
"l.·L···· ,·,·,·, ;·r\lc.·, ,.-... •.·.·.· · ..• :.·, . • ····,·, .. --,: 1···1 ',.,.,.,·,_ ... ,',·,··.! 
'····- -. __ . · ·e: Llr1iversit.:y o-f Zirnt)abwe, 198:~) 
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its growing foreign debt. Turning to the International Monetary 
Fund, the government accepted the typical 'austerity' package. 
It cut back on education, social welfare and efforts to 
restructure the economy, raised interest rates, froze wages, and 
devalued the currency. It essentially halted further resettlement 
though less than ten percent of the peasants had received <mostly 
abandoned) commercial farm land. Explicitly adopt1ng the Kenya 
model, the government shifted its focus to the former Tribal 
Trust Lands (now re-named Communal Areas, but still grossly 
overcrowded) . In 1984-5, as good rains fell, a strata of 
relaatively well-to-do peasants, benefitt1ng from credit and 
marketing ass1stance, produced about a third of the nation ' s 
mar·keted maise. Rising import costs aggravated inflation. 
Unemployment mounted. In the western provinces, the government 
countered rural discontent by military action, imposing martial 
law, and detaining and brutalizing members of the main opposition 
party whom it accused as supporters of dissidents'(};' 
By 1986, as it alternately pressured and negotiated with 
4'opposition leaders to form a one-party state, the ruly party ' s 
~:~-S~~-~ national agenda no longer appeared to include meaningful 
.r '1. 
/ _ ~~ ""tructural change. 
f!)~ 
7. As eleswhere, South Africa-trained 
supported dissidents to fuirther destabilize 
"Pretoria's Secret War Against Zimbabwe)" The 
Apr. 30, 1984 
and armed elements 
the situation; see 
Manchester Gua~dian, 
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cJe[:Jarecj all n1irli1·1g i:llegal dLtring SoLtth Africa's occupation~ F~1o 
ccJntinued air··fr-e:ightirlg of ur·atlilAffi to wester·r1 
ar1d foreign exchange to the South Afr1can 
~;uuth 
led by tt1e United States~ mar1euvered to prevent SWAPO ·from 
introdu1:ir1g a 'r··adical In t.hc! 1'77():~:;.q 
F~·frica's a·ttem1~t to impose its own TurnhalJ.e formula for an 
:i. n "1::. E'· r- n .::1 ] ~:; o 1 1...1. t. :i. c:; n f ,..::·! .1. l ,:,;~_ p ,·,:\ r· t .. CJn \."Llmi.ni . ."..J .i.r1tc) offict:0 1n tl··~e:· 
1980~, the Reagan Administration refused pr·ess South A·t·r·1ca to 
J.iberate Namibia until Ar1gola agreed ser1d home all Cuban tr·ocJrJs 
In the mid }i)80s, in violation of United NatiiJns 
Ir1s1de SoiJth Afl~ica itself, tt1e l1be~ation ·for-ces qJlrted new 
mi.litar\' w1ng o·f the banned African Natior1al Congress, sabc1taged 
·t' ··l·f· .· ... . " 'l.l. '::; 
··c:_~c:.tnot€::-d 
• ..••• A. 
· ... • '·"'. 
·:~~- t:::-~ c. t :i. D r 1 br·· :i. t:·?+ l y 
1n bt:-?:i. dma.n, ThE~ 
~:; u rn rn i:!\ 1 · i ;::. E~ ~::; rn i:::( L f.-? r·· :i. .;,!\ 1 r·· f..? p o r·· t 0::2 c1 
Roots of Crisis,op. cit .. ~ esp. 
~:t.nd 
Ch ~~ .... 

increasing numbers of econom1c and m1l1tary installations. Some 
600 grassroots-based organizations joined to form the United 
Democratic Front <UDF> which mobilized successful nation-wide 
protests against the South Africa's meaningless constitutional 
reforms. Students boycotted discr1minatory i antu' education. 
Community groups protested rent and bus fare hikes promulgated by 
township and bantustan administrations. Trade unions supported 
community actions and organized their own strikes and 
stay-at-homes. Militants attacked police and armed soldiers, 
blew up police stations and administrative buildings, and killed 
those regime-appointed officials who refused to resign. The 
violence spilled over into white areas. Despite imposition of 




detent1ons, torture, and shooting of demonstrators, 
~\c..c..k. 
rendered several major~ townships ungovernable. 
Coupled with the impact of international recession, mounting 
violence led to capital flight. International anti-aparthied 
protests forced foreign banks to refuse to roll over South 
Africa's $20 billion international debt. This threatened its 
capacity to import oil and the sophisticated technologies and 
military hardware that even its relatively advanced industrial 
capacity could not produce. The regime halted remittances of 
capital. It called a moratorium on repayments of its 
international debts. The rand's value plummeted to an all time 
low. Yet the western bankers d1d not declare the South Africa 
- ?~> -

~lo~. despi·te proposals backed by a majority of UN 
nlember-s~ did the westetrn powers agree to ~f·fcctive sar1ctions to 
Instead~ the inte~national f1nancJ.al 
c:rJ!ilnlunit)' entet·ed into betlind--the-scene negotiations with tt1e 
Sot;th (~frican ~egimB and its corpor-ate al.lies. 
r1ei.gt1bors' effo~ts to ~estructure their economies SIJggests that 
t~10 oL~tcome of the J.iberation strLAggle wi.tl1in Soutt1 Ai:rica, 
itsel·f, will ha'!P a major impact, not only on the lives of 1ts 
and even for developmer1t throughout the region. 
[)espite widely d1f·i:er1r1g Ideological and political 
iJer-spec:tiv~s ·following the liberation o·f ZimiJabwe in 1980, n1r1e 
J.r·1cjependent SCJt.Atl1er·r1 African cour1t1~ies joined the Soutt·ler-r1 
Afr1car1 l)eveloplnent Coor-dination Confer-ence CSADCC) to attain 
~5el·f--r-e:Liant ecor1omic development and redLAc:e Suutt1 Afr 1 can 
domir1ation o·f the region. Drawing on the e:·(periences of cJther 
.....-e .. I~---·c:·nic::,J.ll·::/·1 1n t.!·tl·::: f::iou.th ,~:\-l.'r··.·,·.,.·.·.·:: .. ,, ... , c t.·i·- 1.-... 1··· ) ·1 ~ ::,"J.l.::i.E~, ,~·· ·•'t .. ···li]'"~f"l 
iJ.c:lrnJ.r·l:i.str··,D.tiun dt::::clEtr·e:.•d .-int0++E·c::tive' t.he kind~~~ of 5 ,::·1 nctic:;r~·;:;:· ... ~:·t 
LJrlilater-aJ.ly impo~;ed agair1st little Nj.c:ar-agua ar-ld Libya. 

intc·i_:_:jl'"a.tion fost.i~r-t:-:-d Ul"lt::~'--/e:n dt-~\/E:-:lopfnPnt. .:1nd lt~d to cur·~+lic::t.:::. 
th\·:~ ... -.- ;;:i.LJI·-··:::t·?d t.cJ HOI' .. k f Dl'". c:omp l t:rnE~nt~!':l.l'··y i ndu.st1··· :i. a.l <::tnc:l <::t~:JI · i C::l . ..i.l tur· a . .I. 
gr·uwt~l based on c:oordinated irlfr·astructural and energy 
···I ;-::." _.- ,,._._, ·1 ···1··, fl 1-"·7·1··, +\fill/ L.-... ., ...... u .. ~-- ···v 
1'he potential, ir1deed tt1e r·1ec:essity, o·f regior·1al ir1teqratior1 
Colonj.a)·-imposed boundar-Ies 
tlinclc!r .. c•c.1 e·f+i(::i.ent:. u~::iE: o-f their reqior1al r··Gsourc:es. (\1 c:)nc· .1 no 
yori' r:ity; all Jar:~ the carJitaJ ar1d the n1ar-~~et size needed to 
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E~ven without So1~th Afr·ica, regional integration could 
~:tC\ ·.:-::;.· i c!r· a.t.r: ..: the~ ~:::pr'"(·?::·.::·:\d o+ pl---oduct i v:i. tv -:!':l.nd hi gh(~r- 1 i ·-·/i f1(:J 
With a regional popL!lation approaching 6~:• 1nillion, 
Using tt1e regiort's r1ct·1 
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, 
industry as a hub around wh1ch to bu1ld an array of lighter 
national industr1es and agricultural development. Angola ' s, 
Moz ambique ' s and Tanzania ' s extensive coastlines and g_:-,re 1 leiil 
deeJ:;-water harbors provide a framework for a cross-continental 
transport network. Zimbabwe could expand its iron and steel 
industry, util1zing not only its own ores, but also, perhaps, 
those of Tanzania and Mozambique, to provide the essential inputs 
for construction, transport and machinery industries. Zambia, 
Botswana. and Namibia could develop copper production, smelting 
and initially processing output in Zambian refiner1es and roll1ng 
mills, and shipping 1t for more advanced fabrication 1n a variety 
of factories in several countries. Tanzanian phosphates might 
form the foundation of a fertilizer chemicals complex. Angola 
could provide oil for refineries of other countries, as well 
e x pand its own refinery to provide refined products for those 
countries without one; and over time might build a 
petro- chemicals 1ndustry for the entire region. Mozambique ' s 
Cabora Basa hydroelectric project might be hooked up in a grid 
with Zimbabwe ' s Kariba, Zamb1a ' s Kafue, and Angola ' s Kunene 
projects, providing electric power for the reg1on ' s industries. 
In th1s initial stage, careful physical and financial plannlng of 
res ource use would enable the participat1ng 
countries to escape continued South African dominat 1on. 
Construction of essential transport networks would open up new 
regional sources of supply of necessary materials and supplies, 

.l,J.\·in~J the -fDuncl<:).t.ion -!··o1,... +ul--t.h€0~ planr1ed cnmplE·inc·nt.ar-:i.ty u+ t.\··~t:· .. ~ 
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r·n IJuild this ~irtd of ~eg:i.o11al integ~ation would ~e11ui~e that 
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factories and agricultural capacity in nieghboring countries. Its 
more advanced industrial capacity could produce machinery and 
equipment at appropr1ate levels of technology for the farms and 
new factories the neighboring countries seek to build. As 
product1vity spread, the rising living standards of the masses of 
the region ' s more than 90 mill1on inhabitants would provide a 
growing market for the continued expansion of the appropriate 
planned industries and agricultural projects,providing more 
employ ment not only in the neighboring states, but also within 
South Africa itself. 
This kind of regional integration does not imply complete 
withdrawal from the wor l d system. On the contrary, assuming 
trade and investments can be arranged on equitable terms, the 
regional inhabitants will benefit considerably from the planned 
import of machinery and equipment. The increased manufacture of 
southern African exports would enhance their foreign exchange 
earnings, enabling them to become more v1able foreign trade 
partners. The United States, for e x ample, today sells per head 
of the population in developed Europe almost ten times as many 
products as it does in southern Afr1ca. Over the next half a 
century, as the free peoples and government of southern African 
coordinate their national and regional pol 1· t · 1 , Ica economJes to 
spread 20th century technologles and 
e mpl oyment 
o p portunities 
' they could build a strong industrlal 
reg l on a n d ral s e 1. 1v1ng 
standards to levels comparable to 





thelr people to reconstruct the1r vulnerable pol1tical economies. 
Despite their radical rhetoric, confronted by drought, 
international recess1on, and entrenched transnational corporate 
links to South Africa, Zimbabwe ' s new leaders - - caught up 1n 
the web of authoritarian state structures -- have made fewer 
s1gnif1cant changes in the lives of the poor. 
Two contradictory features have altered, but may not have 
fundamentally swerved the process of transformation taking place 
in southern Africa: First, the newly independent countries, 
embroiled in international crises, drought and South African 
destabilization, encountered difficulties in restructuring their 
own institutions, let alone coordinat1ng them to build a united, 
self-reliant regional political economy. This slowed the 
momentum that, by 1980, had seemed to gather for atta1nment of 
the first stage of regional integration to attain self-reliant 
development and reduce dependence on South Africa. 
On the other hand, Nambia's liberation movement, SWAPD, still 
struggles for liberation, rendering South Afr1can occupation an 
increasingly heavy burden for the minority regime. Inside South 
Africa itself, ten years after the So weto uprising, the 
1 i berati on movement has rendered ~townships ungovernable. 
This ra1ses the possibility that, 1n a second stage of reg 1onal 
integration, a free South Afr1ca will part1c1pate as an equal 
partner with 1ts neighbors to restructure the regional political 
!'h8 DLttcc>me wil.l deper1d or1 the resolution of conflict0 21·1d 
LClf·lt~·adict1or1s at tao many J.evel.s to even att.empt a ·for-ecast. 
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